GARRISON S. JOHNSON, PETITIONER v.
CALIFORNIA ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[February 23, 2005]
JUSTICE
O.CONNOR delivered
the opinion of the Court. The California Department of Corrections (CDC) has an
unwritten policy of racially segregating prisoners in double cells in reception
centers for up to 60 days each time they enter a new correctional facility. We
consider whether strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review for an equal
protection challenge to that policy.
I
A
CDC
institutions house all new male inmates and all male inmates transferred from
other state facilities in reception centers for up to 60 days upon their
arrival. During that time, prison officials evaluate the inmates to determine
their ultimate placement. Double-cell assignments in the reception centers are
based on a number of factors, predominantly race. In fact, the CDC has admitted
that the chances of an inmate being assigned a cellmate of another race are
“[p]retty close” to zero percent. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 3a. The CDC further subdivides prisoners within each
racial group. Thus, Japanese-Americans are housed separately from Chinese-Americans, and Northern California Hispanics are separated
from Southern California Hispanics.
The
CDC.s asserted rationale for this practice is that it is necessary to prevent
violence caused by racial gangs. Brief for Respondents 1.6.
It cites numerous incidents of racial violence in CDC facilities and identifies
five major prison gangs in the State: Mexican Mafia, Nuestra
Familia, Black Guerilla Family, Aryan Brotherhood,
and Nazi Low Riders. Id., at 2. The CDC
also notes that prison-gang culture is violent and murderous. Id., at 3. An
associate warden testified that if race were not considered in making initial
housing assignments, she is certain there would be racial conflict in the cells
and in the yard. App. 215a. Other prison officials
also expressed their belief that violence and conflict would result if
prisoners were not segregated. See, e.g.,
id., at 305a.306a. The CDC claims that it must therefore
segregate all inmates while it determines whether they pose a danger to
others. See Brief for Respondents 29.
With
the exception of the double cells in reception areas, the rest of the state
prison facilities—dining areas, yards, and cells—are fully integrated. After
the initial 60-day period, prisoners are allowed to choose their own cellmates.
The CDC usually grants inmate requests to be housed together, unless there are
security reasons for denying them.
B
Garrison
Johnson is an African-American inmate in the custody of the CDC. He has been
incarcerated since 1987 and, during that time, has been housed at a number of
California prison facilities. Fourth Amended Complaint 3, Record, Doc. No. 78.
Upon his arrival at Folsom prison in 1987, and each time he was transferred to
a new facility thereafter, Johnson was double-celled with another
African-American inmate. See ibid.
Johnson
filed a complaint pro se in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California on February 24, 1995, alleging that the CDC.s reception center
housing policy violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment by assigning him cellmates on the basis of his race. He alleged that,
from 1987 to 1991, former CDC Director James Rowland instituted and enforced an
unconstitutional policy of housing inmates according to race. Second Amended
Complaint 2.4, Record, Doc. No. 21. Johnson made the same allegations against
former Director James Gomez for the period from 1991 until the filing of his
complaint. Ibid. The District Court
dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Johnson had stated a
claim for racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Johnson
v. California, 207 F. 3d 650, 655 (2000).
On
remand, Johnson was appointed counsel and granted leave to amend his complaint.
On July 5, 2000, he filed his Fourth Amended Complaint. Record,
Doc. No. 81. Johnson claimed that the CDC.s policy of racially
segregating all inmates in reception-center cells violated his rights under the
Equal Protection Clause. Johnson sought damages, alleging that former CDC
Directors Rowland and Gomez, in their individual capacities, violated his
constitutional rights by formulating and implementing the CDC.s housing policy.
He also sought injunctive relief against former CDC Director Stephen Cambra.
Johnson
has consistently challenged, and the CDC has consistently defended, the policy
as a whole.as it relates to both new inmates and inmates transferred from other
facilities. Johnson was first segregated in 1987 as a new inmate when he
entered the CDC facility at Folsom. Since 1987, he has been segregated each
time he has been transferred to a new facility. Thus, he has been subject to
the CDC.s policy both as a new inmate and as an inmate transferred from one
facility to another.
After
discovery, the parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted
summary judgment to the defendants on grounds that they were entitled to
qualified immunity because their conduct was not clearly unconstitutional. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 321 F. 3d
791 (2003). It held that the constitutionality of the CDC.s policy
should be reviewed under the deferential standard we articulated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987) —not strict scrutiny. 321 F. 3d, at 798.799. Applying Turner, it held
that Johnson had the burden of refuting the “common-sense connection” between
the policy and prison violence. 321 F. 3d, at 802.
Though it believed this was a “close case,” id., at 798, the Court of Appeals concluded that the policy
survived Turner’s deferential standard, 321 F. 3d, at 807.
The
Court of Appeals denied Johnson’s petition for rehearing en banc. Judge
Ferguson, joined by three others, dissented on grounds that “[t]he panel.s decision ignore[d] the Supreme Court’s repeated and
unequivocal command that all racial classifications imposed by the government
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny, and fail[ed] to recognize that [the] Turner analysis
is inapplicable in cases, such as this one, in which the right asserted is not
inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives.”
336 F. 3d 1117 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). We granted certiorari to decide which standard of review
applies. 540 U. S. 1217 (2004).
II
A
We
have held that “all racial classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis added). Under strict
scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications
“are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests.” Ibid. We have insisted on
strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called “benign” racial
classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions policies, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.
S. 306, 326 (2003), race-based preferences in government contracts, see Adarand, supra, at 226, and race-based districting intended to improve minority
representation, see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 650 (1993).
The
reasons for strict scrutiny are familiar. Racial classifications raise special
fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose. Thus, we have admonished
time and again that, “[a]bsent searching judicial
inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no
way of determining . . . what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.” Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion). We therefore apply strict scrutiny to all racial
classifications to “‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that
[government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool.” Ibid.1
The
CDC claims that its policy should be exempt from our categorical rule because
it is “neutral”—that is, it “neither benefits nor burdens one group or
individual more than any other group or individual.” Brief
for Respondents 16. In other words, strict scrutiny should not apply
because all prisoners are .equally. segregated. The
CDC.s argument ignores our repeated command that “racial classifications
receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the
races equally.” Shaw, supra, at 651. Indeed,
we rejected the notion that separate can ever be equal—or “neutral”—50 years
ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), and we refuse to resurrect it today.
See also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 410 (1991) (rejecting the argument that
race-based peremptory challenges were permissible because they applied equally
to white and black jurors and holding that “[i]t is
axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption
that all persons suffer them in equal degree”).
We
have previously applied a heightened standard of review in evaluating racial
segregation in prisons. In Lee
v. Washington, 390 U. S. 333 (1968) (per
curiam), we upheld
a three-judge court’s decision striking down Alabama .s policy of segregation
in its prisons. Id., at 333-334. Alabama had argued that desegregation would
undermine prison security and discipline, id., at 334, but we rejected that contention. Three Justices
concurred “to make explicit something that is left to be gathered only by
implication from the Court’s opinion”—“that prison authorities have the right,
acting in good faith and in particularized
circumstances, to take into account racial tensions
in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons and jails.” Ibid.
(emphasis added). The concurring Justices emphasized that they were “unwilling
to assume that state or local prison authorities might mistakenly regard such
an explicit pronouncement as evincing any dilution of this Court’s firm
commitment to the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of racial discrimination.”
Ibid.
The
need for strict scrutiny is no less important here, where prison officials cite
racial violence as the reason for their policy. As we have recognized in the
past, racial classifications “threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of
their membership in a racial group and to incite
racial hostility.” Shaw, supra, at 643 (citing J.
A. Croson Co., supra, at 493
(plurality opinion) (emphasis added)). Indeed, by insisting that inmates be
housed only with other inmates of the same race, it is possible that prison
officials will breed further hostility among prisoners and reinforce racial and
ethnic divisions. By perpetuating the notion that race matters most, racial
segregation of inmates “may exacerbate the very patterns of [violence that it
is] said to counteract.” Shaw, supra, at 648; see also Trulson & Marquart, The Caged Melting Pot: Toward an Understanding of
the Consequences of Desegregation in Prisons, 36 Law & Soc. Rev. 743, 774
(2002) (in a study of prison desegregation, finding that “over [10 years] the
rate of violence between inmates segregated by race in double cells surpassed
the rate among those racially integrated”). See also Brief for Former State
Corrections Officials as Amici
Curiae 19 (opinion of former corrections
officials from six States that “racial integration of cells tends to diffuse
racial tensions and thus diminish interracial violence” and that “a blanket
policy of racial segregation of inmates is contrary to sound prison
management”).
The
CDC’s policy is unwritten. Although California claimed at oral argument that
two other States follow a similar policy, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-31, this
assertion was unsubstantiated, and we are unable to confirm or deny its
accuracy.2 Virtually all other States and the Federal Government manage
their prison systems without reliance on racial segregation. See Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 24. Federal regulations governing the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) expressly prohibit racial segregation. 28 CFR §551.90 (2004)
(“[BOP] staff shall not discriminate against inmates on the basis of race,
religion, national origin, sex, disability, or political belief. This includes
the making of administrative decisions and providing access to work, housing
and programs”). The United States contends that racial integration actually
“leads to less violence in BOP.s institutions and better prepares inmates for
re-entry into society.” Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 25. Indeed, the United States argues, based on its
experience with the BOP, that it is possible to address .concerns of prison
security through individualized consideration without the use of racial
segregation, unless warranted as a necessary and temporary response to a race
riot or other serious threat of race-related violence..
Id., at 24. As to
transferees, in particular, whom the CDC has already evaluated at least once,
it is not clear why more individualized determinations are not possible.
Because
the CDC.s policy is an express racial classification, it is “immediately
suspect.” Shaw, 509 U. S., at 642; see also Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 485 (1982). We therefore hold that the
Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply strict scrutiny to the CDC.s
policy and to require the CDC to demonstrate that its policy is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
B
The
CDC invites us to make an exception to the rule that strict scrutiny applies to
all racial classifications, and instead to apply the deferential standard of
review articulated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 (1987), because its segregation policy
applies only in the prison context. We decline the invitation. In Turner, we considered
a claim by Missouri prisoners that regulations restricting inmate marriages and
inmate-to-inmate correspondence were unconstitutional. Id., at 81. We
rejected the prisoners’ argument that the regulations should be subject to
strict scrutiny, asking instead whether the regulation that burdened the
prisoners. fundamental rights was “reasonably related”
to “legitimate penological interests.” Id., at 89.
We
have never applied Turner to racial classifications. Turner
itself did not involve any racial classification,
and it cast no doubt on Lee. We think this unsurprising, as we have applied Turner’s
reasonable-relationship test only
to rights that are “inconsistent with
proper incarceration.” Overton
v. Bazzetta,
539 U. S. 126, 131 (2003); see also Pell
v. Procunier,
417 U. S. 817, 822 (1974) (“[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment
rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system“). This is because certain privileges and rights must necessarily be
limited in the prison context. See O’Lone
v. Estate
of Shabazz, 482 U.
S. 342, 348 (1987) (“’[L]awful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a
retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system’”
(quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S 266, 285 (1948))). Thus, for example, we have
relied on Turner in addressing First Amendment challenges to prison
regulations, including restrictions on freedom of association, Overton, supra; limits on
inmate correspondence, Shaw
v. Murphy, 532 U. S. 223 (2001); restrictions on inmates’ access to
courts, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343 (1996); restrictions on receipt of
subscription publications, Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U. S. 401 (1989); and work rules limiting prisoners’
attendance at religious services, Shabazz, supra. We have
also applied Turner to some due process claims, such as involuntary medication
of mentally
ill prisoners, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.
S. 210 (1990); and restrictions on the right to marry, Turner, supra.
The
right not to be discriminated against based on one’s race is not susceptible to
the logic of Turner. It is not a right that need necessarily be compromised for
the sake of proper prison administration. On the contrary, compliance with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination is not only consistent with
proper prison administration, but also bolsters the legitimacy of the entire
criminal justice system. Race discrimination is “especially pernicious in the
administration of justice.” Rose
v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 555 (1979). And public respect for our
system of justice is undermined when the system discriminates based on race.
Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 99 (1986) (“[P]ublic
respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be
strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service
because of his race”). When government officials are permitted to use race as a
proxy for gang membership and violence without demonstrating a compelling
government interest and proving that their means narrowly tailored, society as
a whole suffers. For similar reasons, we have not used Turner to
evaluate Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment in prison. We
judge violations of that Amendment under the “deliberate indifference”
standard, rather than Turner’s “reasonably related” standard. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.
S. 730, 738 (2002) (asking whether prison officials displayed “’deliberate
indifference’ to the inmate’s health or safety” where an inmate claimed that
they violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment (quoting
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.
S. 1, 8 (1992))). This is because the integrity of the
criminal justice system depends on full compliance with the Eighth Amendment.
See Spain v. Procunier, 600 F. 2d 189, 193.194 (CA9 1979) (Kennedy, J.) (“[T]he
full protections of the eighth amendment most certainly remain in force [in
prison]. The whole point of the amendment is to protect persons convicted of
crimes. . . . Mechanical deference to the findings of state prison officials in
the context of the eighth amendment would reduce that provision to a nullity in
precisely the context where it is most necessary” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
In
the prison context, when the government’s power is at its apex, we think that
searching judicial review of racial classifications is necessary to guard
against invidious discrimination. Granting the CDC an exemption from the rule
that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications would undermine our
“unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice
system.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 309 (1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The
CDC argues that “[d]eference to the particular
expertise of prison officials in the difficult task of managing daily prison
operations” requires a more relaxed standard of review for its segregation
policy. Brief for Respondents 18. But we have refused
to defer to state officials’ judgments on race in other areas where those
officials traditionally exercise substantial discretion. For example, we have
held that, despite the broad discretion given to prosecutors when they use
their peremptory challenges, using those challenges to strike jurors on the
basis of their race is impermissible. See Batson, supra, at 89.96. Similarly, in the redistricting context, despite
the traditional deference given to States when they design their electoral
districts, we have subjected redistricting plans to strict scrutiny when States
draw district lines based predominantly on race. Compare generally Vieth v. Jubilier, 541 U. S. 267 (2004) (partisan gerrymandering), with Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S.
630 (1993) (racial gerrymandering).
We
did not relax the standard of review for racial classifications in prison in Lee, and we
refuse to do so today. Rather, we explicitly reaffirm what we implicitly held
in Lee: The “necessities of prison security and discipline,” 390 U.
S., at 334, are a compelling government interest justifying only those uses of
race that are narrowly tailored to address those necessities. See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 353 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Lee for the
principle that “protecting prisoners from violence might justify narrowly
tailored racial discrimination”); J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U.
S., at 521 (SCALIA,
J., concurring) (citing Lee
for the proposition that “only a social
emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life or limb—for example, a
prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates—can justify an
exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens’” (quoting Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))); see
also Pell, 417 U. S., at 823 (“[C]entral to
all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal
security within the correctional facilities themselves”).
JUSTICE
THOMAS would
subject race-based policies in prisons to Turner’s deferential standard of review because, in his view,
judgments about whether race-based policies are necessary “are better left in
the first instance to the officials who run our Nation’s prisons.” Post, at 20. But Turner is too
lenient a standard to ferret out invidious uses of race. Turner requires
only that the policy be “reasonably related” to “legitimate penological
interests.” 482 U. S., at 89. Turner would
allow prison officials to use race-based policies even when there are
race-neutral means to accomplish the same goal, and even when the race-based
policy does not in practice advance that goal. See, e.g., 321 F.
3d, at 803 (case below) (reasoning that, under Turner, the
Court of Appeals did “not have to agree that the policy actually advances the
CDC.s legitimate interest, but only [that] ‘defendants might reasonably have
thought that the policy would advance its interests’”). See also Turner, supra, at 90
(warning that Turner is not a “least restrictive alternative test” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
For
example, in JUSTICE THOMAS’ world, prison officials could segregate visiting areas on
the ground that racial mixing would cause unrest in the racially charged prison
atmosphere. Under Turner, “[t]he prisoner would have to prove that there would not be a
riot. [But] [i]t is certainly ‘plausible’ that such a
riot could ensue: our society, as well as our prisons, contains enough racists
that almost any interracial interaction could potentially lead to conflict.” 336 F. 3d, at 1120 (case below) (Ferguson, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). Indeed, under JUSTICE
THOMASs
view, there is no obvious limit to permissible segregation in prisons. It is
not readily apparent why, if segregation in reception centers is justified,
segregation in the dining halls, yards, and general housing areas is not also
permissible. Any of these areas could be the potential site of racial violence.
If JUSTICE THOMAS’ approach were to carry the day, even the blanket
segregation policy struck down in Lee
might stand a chance of survival if
prison officials simply asserted that it was necessary to prison management. We
therefore reject the Turner standard for racial classifications in prisons because it
would make rank discrimination too easy to defend.
The
CDC protests that strict scrutiny will handcuff prison administrators and
render them unable to address legitimate problems of race-based violence in
prisons. See also post, at 9, 24.25 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Not so. Strict scrutiny is not “strict in
theory, but fatal in fact.” Adarand,
515 U. S., at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted); Grutter, 539 U. S., at 326.327 (“Although all governmental uses of
race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it”). Strict
scrutiny does not preclude the ability of prison officials to address the
compelling interest in prison safety. Prison administrators, however, will have
to demonstrate that any race-based policies are narrowly tailored to that end.
See id., at 327 (“When race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring
requirement is also satisfied”).3
The
fact that strict scrutiny applies “says nothing about the ultimate validity of
any particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict
scrutiny.” Adarand, supra, at 229.230. At this
juncture, no such determination has been made. On remand, the CDC will have the
burden of demonstrating that its policy is narrowly tailored with regard to new
inmates as well as transferees. Prisons are dangerous places, and the special
circumstances they present may justify racial classifications in some contexts.
Such circumstances can be considered in applying strict scrutiny, which is
designed to take relevant differences into account.
III
We
do not decide whether the CDC’s policy violates the Equal Protection Clause. We
hold only that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review and remand the
case to allow the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, or the District
Court, to apply it in the first instance. See Consolidated
Rail Corporation v. Gottshal,
512 U. S. 532, 557. 558 (1994) (reversing and remanding for
the lower court to apply the correct legal standard in the first instance); Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1031.1032 (1992) (same). The judgment
of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
THE
CHIEF JUSTICE
took no part in the decision of this case. [Ginsburg, joined
by Souter and Breyer, concurred (omitted). Stevens
dissented (excerpted below). Thomas, joined by Scalia, dissented (excerpted
below).]
......
1 JUSTICE
THOMAS takes
a hands-off approach to racial classifications
in
prisons, suggesting that a .compelling showing [is] needed to overcome
the
deference we owe to prison administrators.. Post,
at 21
(dissenting opinion). But such deference is fundamentally at
odds with
our
equal protection jurisprudence. We put the burden on state actors
to
demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified.
2 Though,
as JUSTICE THOMAS
points out, see post,
at 22.23, and n. 12,
inmates
in reception centers in Oklahoma and Texas .are not generally
assigned
randomly to racially integrated cells,. it is also the
case that
.these
inmates are not precluded from integrated cell assignments..
Oklahoma
Dept. of Corrections, Policies and Procedures, Operations
Memorandum
No. OP.030102, Inmate Housing (Sept. 16,
2004), available
at
http://www.doc.state.ok.us/docs/policies.htm (as visited Jan. 21, 2005,
and
available in the Clerk of Court’s case file); Texas Dept. of Criminal
Justice,
Security Memorandum No. SM.01.28, Assignment
to General
Population
Two-Person Cells (June 15, 2002). See also Brief for Former
State
Corrections Officials as Amici
Curiae 20, n. 10 (.To the extent that
race
is considered in the assignment calculus in Oklahoma, it appears to be
one
factor among many, and as a result, individualized consideration is
given
to all inmates.). We therefore have no way of knowing whether, in
practice,
inmates in Oklahoma and Texas, like those in California, have
close
to no chance, App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a, of being celled with a person of
a
different race. See also Brief for Former State Corrections Officials as
Amici Curiae 19.20
(“[W]e are aware of no state other than California that
assumes
that every incoming prisoner is incapable of getting along with a
cell
mate of a different race. And we are aware of no state other than
California
that has acted on such an assumption by adopting an inflexible
and
absolute policy of racial segregation of double cells in reception
centers”).
3 JUSTICE
THOMAS characterizes
the CDC.s policy as a .limited. one,
see
post,
at 2, but the CDC’s policy is in fact sweeping in its application.
It
applies to all prisoners
housed in double cells in reception centers,
whether
newly admitted or transferred from one facility to another.
Moreover,
despite JUSTICE THOMAS.
suggestion that the CDC considers
other
nonracial factors in determining housing placements, the CDC
itself
has admitted that, in practice, there is a “’[p]retty
close’” to zero
percent
chance that an inmate will be housed with a person of a different
race.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. See also generally post, at 1.2,
and
n.
1 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting). Thus, despite an inmate’s “age, physical
size,
mental health, medical needs, [and] criminal history,” post, at 13
(THOMAS,
J., dissenting), the fact that he is black categorically precludes
him
from being celled with a white inmate. As we explain, see
infra,
at 15, we do not decide whether the
threat of violence in California
prisons
is sufficient to justify such a broad policy.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia
joins, dissenting.
The questions presented in this case require us to resolve two
conflicting lines of precedent. On the one hand, as the Court stresses, this
Court has said that “ ‘all racial classifications
reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.’ ” Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (emphasis
added) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)). On the other, this
Court has no less categorically said that “the [relaxed] standard of review we
adopted in Turner [v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987),]
applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration
implicate constitutional rights.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224
(1990) (emphasis added).
Emphasizing the former line of cases, the majority resolves
the conflict in favor of strict scrutiny. I disagree. The Constitution has
always demanded less within the prison walls. Time and again, even when faced
with constitutional rights no less “fundamental” than the right to be free from
state-sponsored racial discrimination, we have deferred to the reasonable
judgments of officials experienced in running this Nation’s prisons. There is
good reason for such deference in this case. California oversees roughly
160,000 inmates, in prisons that have been a breeding ground for some of the
most violent prison gangs in America–all of them organized along racial lines.
In that atmosphere, California racially segregates a portion of its inmates, in
a part of its prisons, for brief periods of up to 60 days, until the State can
arrange permanent housing. The majority is concerned with sparing inmates the
indignity and stigma of racial discrimination. Ante, at 6—7.
California is concerned with their safety and saving their lives. I
respectfully dissent. . . .
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
In my judgment a state policy of segregating prisoners by
race during the first 60 days of their incarceration, as well as the first 60
days after their transfer from one facility to another, violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The California Department of
Corrections (CDC) has had an ample opportunity to justify its policy during the
course of this litigation, but has utterly failed to do so whether judged under
strict scrutiny or the more deferential standard set out in Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987). The CDC had no incentive in the proceedings below to
withhold evidence supporting its policy; nor has the CDC made any offer of
proof to suggest that a remand for further factual development would serve any
purpose other than to postpone the inevitable. I therefore agree with the
submission of the United States as amicus curiae that the Court should hold the
policy unconstitutional on the current record. . . .