Stoic Cosmology
Cicero (106-43 B.C. ) On the Nature of the Gods (Francis Brooks translation) References are
to book and section.
II.7. And the element which surpasses all these, I mean reason, and if we care to express it by a variety of terms, intelligence, design, reflection, foresight, where did we find, whence did we secure it? Shall the universe possess all other qualities, and not this one which is of most importance? Yet surely in all creation there is nothing nobler than the universe, nothing more excellent and more beautiful. There not only is not, but there cannot even be imagined anything nobler, and if reason and wisdom are the noblest of qualities, it is inevitable that they should exist in that which we acknowledge to be supremely noble. Again, who can help assenting to what I say when he considers the harmonious, concordant, and unbroken connection which there is in things? Would the earth be able to have one and the same time for flowering, and then again one and the same time in which it lies rough? Or could the approach and departure of the sun be known, at the time of the summer and winter solstice, by so many objects spontaneously changing? Or the tides of the sea, and of narrow straits, be affected by the rising or setting of the moon? Or the dissimilar movements of the planets be maintained by the one revolution of the whole sky? It would be certainly impossible for these things to come to pass in this way, with such mutual harmony amongst all parts of the universe, if they were not held together by one divine and all-pervading spirit. And this position, if argued, as I intend to argue it, in a fuller and more flowing style, is better able to escape the cavilling of the Academics, whereas if expressed more briefly and concisely in syllogistic form, as it used to be by Zeno, it is more exposed to criticism. For just as it is either difficult or impossible for a running stream to be tainted, while this may easily happen to water that is confined, so the onward flow of argument sweeps away the detractions of the critic, while that which is confined within narrow limits has hard work to defend itself. These arguments, for instance, which are expanded by modern Stoics, used to be compressed by Zeno as follows:—
II.8. “That which exercises reason is more excellent than that which does not exercise reason; there is nothing more excellent than the universe, therefore the universe exercises reason”. In the same way it may be proved that the universe is wise, blessed, and eternal, for all objects that possess these qualities are more excellent than those which do not possess them, and there is nothing of greater excellence than the universe. By this means it will be proved that the universe is divine. He has also the following: “No part can be sentient where the whole is not sentient; parts of the universe are sentient, therefore the universe is sentient”. He goes further and urges his point in more precise terms. “Nothing,” he says, “that is inanimate and without reason can produce from itself a being that is animate and possessed of reason; the universe produces beings that are animate and possessed of reason, therefore the universe is animate and possessed of reason.” He also, as his habit frequently was, stated the argument in the form of a comparison, which was to this effect: “If melodiously piping flutes sprang from the olive, would you doubt that a knowledge of flute-playing resided in the olive? And what if plane trees bore harps which gave forth rhythmical sounds? Clearly you would think in the same way that the art of music was possessed by plane trees. Why, then, seeing that the universe gives birth to beings that are animate and wise, should it not be considered animate and wise itself?”
II.11. There is, then, an element which holds together and maintains the entire universe, an element, moreover, which is not without sensation and reason. For it is necessary that every element which is not isolated or simple, but which is joined and linked with something else, should have in itself some ruling principle, as, for instance, mind in the case of man, and in the case of animals something similar to mind, which prompts their desires. In trees, and in things which spring from the earth, the ruling principle is supposed to be placed in their roots. By ruling principle I mean the principle which the Greeks call ἡγεμονικόν, which cannot but hold, and which ought to hold, the highest place in each genus. Consequently the thing in which the ruling principle of the whole of nature is contained, must in the same way be the most perfect of all, and the most worthy of power and dominion over all existence. Now we see that in parts of the universe (for there is nothing in the entire universe which is not a part of the whole), sensation and reason exist. These qualities must therefore exist, and exist more vividly and to a greater extent, in that part in which the ruling principle of the universe resides. Consequently the universe must be intelligent, and the element which holds all things in its embrace must excel in perfection of reason; the universe, therefore, must be divine, and so must the element by which the whole strength of the universe is held together. This fiery glow which the universe possesses is also far purer, clearer, and nimbler, and on that account better fitted to arouse sensation, than this heat of ours, by which the objects known to us are preserved and made strong. Since, then, men and animals are maintained by this heat, and through it possess motion and sensation, it is absurd to say that the universe is without sensation, when it is maintained by a burning heat which is unmixed, and free, and pure, and at the same time in the highest degree vivid and nimble, especially considering that the heat which belongs to the universe is moved by itself and its own action, and is not stirred by anything distinct from itself, or by impact from outside. For what can be mightier than the universe, so as to act upon and set in motion the heat by which the universe is to be held together?
II.12. Let us hear Plato on this question, Plato, the god of philosophers, as he may be called. He holds that there are two kinds of motion, one self-imparted and the other derived, and that a thing which is self-moved by its own action is more divine than that which is set in motion by impact from something else. The former kind of motion he declares to exist in soul alone, and he is of opinion that it was from soul that the first principle of motion was derived. Consequently since all motion arises from the heat possessed by the universe, and since that heat is moved by its own action, and not by impact from anything else, it must of necessity be soul, by which means it is proved that the universe is possessed of soul. It may also be understood that intelligence exists in the universe, from the fact that the universe is undeniably of greater excellence than any form of being. For just as there is no part of our body which is not less important than ourselves, so the whole universe must be more important than a part of the universe. If that is so, the universe must be intelligent, for if it were not, man, who is a part of the universe, would, as participating in reason, necessarily be of more importance than the entire universe. If, again, we wish to trace the advance from the first and rudimentary stages of being to the final and perfect, it is to a divine nature that we must come. For we observe that the first things maintained by nature are those which spring from the earth, to which nature has assigned nothing more than protection by means of nurture and development. To animals she has given sensation, movement, an impulse, combined with a certain desire, towards what is beneficial, and an avoidance of what is hurtful. To man she has given more in having added reason, which was meant to regulate the desires of the mind, at one time allowing them their way, and at another holding them in check.
II.13. The fourth and highest stage consists of beings who are created naturally good and wise, in whom right reason in an unchanging form is innate from the beginning, that reason which must be regarded as more than human, and must be assigned to what is divine, that is, to the universe, in which this complete and perfect reason must needs exist. For it cannot be said that in any order of things there is not something final and perfect. Just as in the case of vines or cattle, we see that, unless some force interposes, nature arrives by a way of her own at perfection, and just as a certain attainment of consummate workmanship exists in painting and architecture and the other arts, so it is inevitable that in collective nature there should much more be a progress towards completion and perfection. Many external influences can prevent the other kinds of being from reaching perfection, but nothing can stand in the way of universal nature, because it itself limits and contains all kinds of being. That, therefore, must be the fourth and highest stage, which no force can come near. Now it is in that stage that universal nature has its place, and since it is the characteristic of that nature that all things should be inferior to it, and nothing able to stand in its way, it necessarily follows that the universe is intelligent, and more than that wise. Besides, what is more foolish than that the nature which embraces all things should not be declared supremely excellent, or that, being supremely excellent, it should not be in the first place animate, in the second possessed of reason and forethought, and lastly wise? In what other way can it be supremely excellent? For if it resembled plants, or even animals, it would not deserve to be considered of the highest degree of excellence, but rather of the lowest, while if it participated in reason, and yet were not wise from the beginning, the condition of the universe as compared with that of man would be the lower of the two. For man can become wise, but if the universe during the limitless course of past time has been destitute of wisdom, it will assuredly never acquire it, and will therefore be lower than man. Since that is absurd, the universe must be regarded as wise from the beginning, and as divine.
II.14. It was, indeed, an ingenious remark of Chrysippus that just as the cover was created for the
shield, and the sheath for the sword, so all other things with the exception of
the universe were created for the sake of something else, the crops and fruits,
for instance, which the earth produces, for the sake of animals, and animals
for the sake of men, as the horse for carrying, the ox for ploughing,
and the dog for hunting and keeping watch. As for man himself, he was born in
order to observe and imitate the universe, being in no wise perfect, but a
particle, so to speak, of that which is, for it is only the universe to which
nothing is wanting, and which is knit together on every side, and is perfect
and complete in all its numbers and parts. Now since the universe embraces all
things, and there is nothing that is not contained within it, it is perfect at
every point. How, then, can that which is of most excellence be lacking to it?
There is nothing more excellent than mind and reason, so it is impossible that
these should be lacking to the universe. Chrysippus,
therefore, is again right when he declares, adding instances, that in what is
matured and perfect everything is of higher excellence, in a horse, for
example, than in a colt, in a dog than in a whelp, in a man than in a boy, and
in like manner that whatever is best in the whole world, must reside in
something that is perfect and complete. As there is nothing more perfect than
the universe, and nothing more excellent than virtue, it follows that virtue is
an attribute of the universe. Human nature is not indeed perfect, yet virtue is
attained in man, so how much more easily in the universe! Virtue, then, does
exist in the universe, which is therefore wise, and consequently divine.
Epictetus (c. late 1st-early 2d A.D.), Discourses (Ernest Barker translations)
i.6. From everything which is or
happens in the world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a man
possesses these two qualities, the faculty of seeing what
belongs and happens to all persons and things, and a grateful disposition.
If he does not possess these two qualities, one man will not see
the use of things which are and which happen; another will not be thankful for them, even if he does know them. If God had made colours, but had not made the faculty of
seeing them, what would have been their use? None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty of
vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the
faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of it? None at all. Well, suppose that He had made both,
but had not made light? In that case, also, they would have been of
no use. Who is it, then, who has fitted this to that and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the knife to the case and the case
to the knife? Is it no one? And, indeed, from the very
structure of things which have attained their completion, we
are accustomed to show that the work is certainly the act of
some artificer, and that it has not been constructed without a
purpose. Does then each of these things demonstrate the workman, and
do not visible things and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him? And the existence of male and female, and the desire of each
for conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are
constructed, do not even these declare the workman? If they do
not, let us consider the constitution of our understanding
according to which, when we meet with sensible objects, we
simply receive impressions from them, but we also select something from them, and subtract something, and add, and compound by means of
them these things or those, and, in fact, pass from some to
other things which, in a manner, resemble them: is not even
this sufficient to move some men, and to induce them not to
forget the workman? If not so, let them explain to us what it
is that makes each several thing, or how it is possible that things
so wonderful and like the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their own proper motion?
What, then, are these things done in us only. Many,
indeed, in us only, of which the
rational animal had peculiar need; but you will find many
common to us with irrational animals. Do they them understand what is
done? By no means. For use is one thing, and
understanding is another: God had need of irrational animals to
make use of appearances, but of us to understand the use of
appearances. It is therefore enough for them to eat and to
drink, and to sleep and to copulate, and to do all the other things
which they severally do. But for us, to whom He has given also the faculty,
these things are not sufficient; for unless we act in a proper and
orderly manner, and conformably to the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. For where the constitutions
of living beings are different, there also the acts and the
ends are different. In those animals, then, whose constitution
is adapted only to use, use alone is enough: but in an animal
which has also the power of understanding the use, unless there
be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never attain
his proper end. Well then God constitutes every animal, one to
be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, another to supply cheese, and another for some like use; for which purposes what need is
there to understand appearances and to be able to distinguish
them? But God has introduced man to be a spectator of God and
of His works; and not only a spectator of them, but an
interpreter. For this reason it is shameful for man to begin
and to end where irrational animals do, but rather he ought to
begin where they begin, and to end where nature ends in us; and nature
ends in contemplation and understanding, in a way of life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die without having been spectators
of these things.
i.14.
When a person asked him how a man could be convinced that all his actions
are under the inspection of God, he answered, Do you not think that
all things are united in one? "I do," the person replied. Well, do you not think that earthly things have a natural agreement and
union with heavenly things? "I do." And how else so
regularly as if by God's command, when He bids the plants to
flower, do they flower? when He bids them to send forth shoots, do they shoot? when
He bids them to produce fruit, how else do they produce fruit?
when He bids the fruit to ripen, does it ripen? when again He bids them to cast down the
fruits, how else do they cast them down? and
when to shed the leaves, do they shed the leaves? and
when He bids them to fold themselves up and to remain quiet
and rest, how else do they remain quiet and rest? And how else
at the growth and the wane of the moon, and at the approach
and recession of the sun, are so great an alteration and
change to the contrary seen in earthly things? But are plants
and our bodies so bound up and united with the whole, and are not our
souls much more? and our souls so bound up and in
contact with God as parts of Him and portions of Him; and does
not God perceive every motion of these parts as being His own
motion connate with Himself? Now are you able to think of the
divine administration, and about all things divine, and at the
same time also about human affairs, and to be moved by ten thousand things at the same time in your senses and in your understanding,
and to assent to some, and to dissent from others, and again
as to some things to suspend your judgment; and do you retain
in your soul so many impressions from so many and various
things, and being moved by them, do you fall upon notions
similar to those first impressed, and do you retain numerous arts and
the memories of ten thousand things; and is not God able to oversee all things, and to be present with all, and to receive from all a
certain communication? And is the sun able to illuminate so
large a part of the All, and to leave so little not
illuminated, that part only which is occupied by the earth's
shadow; and He who made the sun itself and makes it go round, being
a small part of Himself compared with the whole, cannot He perceive all things?
"But I cannot," the man may reply, "comprehend all these things at once." But who tells you that you have equal power with
Zeus? Nevertheless he has placed by every man a guardian,
every man's Demon, to whom he has committed the care of the
man, a guardian who never sleeps, is never deceived. For to
what better and more careful guardian could He have entrusted each of us? When, then, you have shut the doors and made darkness
within, remember never to say that you are alone, for you are not;
but God is within, and your Demon is within, and what need
have they of light to see what you are doing? To this God you
ought to swear an oath just as the soldiers do to Caesar. But
they who are hired for pay swear to regard the safety of
Caesar before all things; and you who have received so many and such great favours, will you not swear, or
when you have sworn, will you not abide by your oath? And what
shall you swear? Never to be disobedient, never to make any
charges, never to find fault with anything that he has given,
and never unwillingly to do or to suffer anything, that is necessary. Is this oath like the soldier's oath? The soldiers swear not to
prefer any man to Caesar: in this oath men swear to honour themselves before all.
iv.7. Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through habit,1 and is it possible that no man can learn from reason and from demonstration that God has made all the things in the universe and the universe itself completely free from hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of comprehending the administration of it; but the rational animal man has faculties for the consideration of all these things, and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, magnanimous and free, man sees that of the things which surround him some are free from hindrance and in his power, and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the power of others; that the things which are free from hindrance are in the power of the will; and those which are subject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good and his interest be in these things only which are free from hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous, happy, free from harm, magnanimous, pious, thankful to God2 for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming any of them.3 But if he thinks that his good and his interest are in externals and in things which are not in the power of his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a slave to those who have the power over the things which he admires (desires) and fears; and he must of necessity be impious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs to him; and he must of necessity be abject and mean.
Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180), Meditations
(George Long translation)
iv.4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens; if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is so, the cosmos is in a manner a state. For of what other common political community will anyone say that the whole human race are members? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some source.
v.27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them, his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is every man's understanding and reason.
vi.44. If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that? For what advantage would result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object of their providence? But if they have not determined about me individually, they have certainly determined about the whole at least, and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine about nothing- which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us- but if however the gods determine about none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the universal: this might be sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the middle kind, neither good nor bad.
vii.9. All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same universe (order). For there is one universe made up of all things, and one God who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, one common reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed there is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same stock and participate in the same reason.
viii.34. If thou didst ever see a
hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from
the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, as far as
he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates himself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast
detached thyself from the natural unity- for thou wast made by nature a part, but now thou
hast cut thyself off- yet here there is this beautiful provision, that
it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no
other part, after it has been separated and cut asunder, to come together again. But consider the kindness by which he has distinguished
man, for he has put it in his power not to be separated at all
from the universal; and when he has been separated, he has
allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place
as a part.
viii.35. As the nature of the universal has given to
every rational being all the other powers that it has, so we
have received from it this power also. For as the universal
nature converts and fixes in its predestined place everything
which stands in the way and opposes it, and makes such things a
part of itself, so also the rational animal is able to make every hindrance
its own material, and to use it for such purposes as it may have designed.
Aristotle (384-322
B.C.) On the Prime Mover: Metaphysics
XII (W.D. Ross translation) References are to the sections of Book XII.
XII.6."Since
there were three kinds of substance, two of them physical and
one unmovable, regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance. For
substances are the first of existing things, and if they are
all destructible, all things are destructible. But it is
impossible that movement should either have come into being or
cease to be (for it must always have existed), or that time
should. For there could not be a before and an after if time did not exist. Movement also is continuous, then, in the sense in which
time is; for time is either the same thing as movement or an
attribute of movement. And there is no continuous movement
except movement in place, and of this only that which is
circular is continuous.
"But if there is something which is capable of moving
things or acting on them, but is not actually doing so, there
will not necessarily be movement; for that which has a potency need not exercise it. Nothing, then, is gained even
if we suppose eternal substances, as the believers in the Forms
do, unless there is to be in them some principle which can
cause change; nay, even this is not enough, nor is another
substance besides the Forms enough; for if it is not to act,
there will be no movement. Further even if it acts, this will not
be enough, if its essence is potency; for there will not be eternal movement, since that which is potentially may possibly not be.
There must, then, be such a principle, whose very essence is
actuality. Further, then, these substances must be without
matter; for they must be eternal, if anything is eternal.
Therefore they must be actuality.
"Yet there is a difficulty; for it is thought that
everything that acts is able to act, but that not everything
that is able to act acts, so that the potency is prior. But if
this is so, nothing that is need be; for it is possible for all things to be capable of existing but not yet to exist.
"Yet if we follow the theologians who generate the world
from night, or the natural philosophers who say that 'all
things were together', the same impossible result ensues. For
how will there be movement, if there is no actually existing cause? Wood will surely not move itself-the carpenter's art must act on
it; nor will the menstrual blood nor
the earth set themselves in motion, but the seeds must act on
the earth and the semen on the menstrual blood.
"This is why some suppose eternal actuality-e.g. Leucippus
and Plato; for they say there is always movement. But why and
what this movement is they do say,
nor, if the world moves in this way or that, do they tell us the cause of its doing so. Now nothing is moved at random, but there must
always be something present to move it; e.g. as a matter of
fact a thing moves in one way by nature,
and in another by force or through the influence of reason or
something else. (Further, what sort of movement is primary? This
makes a vast difference.) But again for Plato, at least, it is not permissible
to name here that which he sometimes supposes to be the source of
movement-that which moves itself; for the soul is later, and coeval with the heavens, according to his account. To suppose potency
prior to actuality, then, is in a sense right, and in a sense
not; and we have specified these senses. That actuality is
prior is testified by Anaxagoras (for his 'reason' is
actuality) and by Empedocles in his doctrine of love and strife, and
by those who say that there is always movement, e.g. Leucippus. Therefore chaos or night did not exist for an infinite time, but the same
things have always existed (either passing through a cycle of
changes or obeying some other law), since actuality is prior to
potency. If, then, there is a constant cycle, something must
always remain, acting in the same way. And if there is to be
generation and destruction, there must be something else which
is always acting in different ways. This must, then, act in one
way in virtue of itself, and in another in virtue of something else-either of a third agent, therefore, or of the first. Now it must be in
virtue of the first. For otherwise this again
causes the motion both of the second agent and of the third.
Therefore it is better to say 'the first'. For it was the cause of eternal
uniformity; and something else is the cause of variety, and evidently both
together are the cause of eternal variety. This, accordingly, is the character
which the motions actually exhibit. What need then is there to seek for other
principles?
XII.7 "Since (1)
this is a possible account of the matter, and (2) if it were
not true, the world would have proceeded out of night and 'all things
together' and out of non-being, these difficulties may be taken as
solved. There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in
theory only but in fact. Therefore the first heaven must be
eternal. There is therefore also something which moves it. And
since that which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is
something which moves without being moved, being eternal,
substance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of
thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For
the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good
is the primary object of rational wish. But desire is
consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire; for the
thinking is the starting-point. And thought is moved by the object of
thought, and one of the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of
thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is
simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for 'one'
means a measure, but 'simple' means that the thing itself has a certain
nature.) But the beautiful, also, and that which is in itself
desirable are in the same column; and the first in any class is always best, or
analogous to the best.
"That a final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the
distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose
good an action is done, and (b) something at which the action aims; and of
these the latter exists among unchangeable entities though the former does not.
The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things
move by being moved. Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise
than as it is. Therefore if its actuality is the primary form of spatial
motion, then in so far as it is subject to change, in this respect it is
capable of being otherwise,-in place, even if not in substance. But since there
is something which moves while itself unmoved,
existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is. For motion in
space is the first of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first
kind of spatial motion; and this the first mover produces. The first mover,
then, exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of
being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has
all these senses-that which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse, that without which the good is impossible,
and that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a
single way.
"On such a principle, then, depend
the heavens and the world of nature. And it is a life such as
the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time (for it
is ever in this state, which we cannot be), since its
actuality is also pleasure. (And for this reason
are waking, perception, and thinking most pleasant, and
hopes and memories are so on account of these.) And thinking in
itself deals with that which is best in itself, and
that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is
best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks on itself because
it shares the nature of the object of thought; for it becomes
an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking
its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the
same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought. But it is active when it possesses
this object. Therefore the possession rather than the
receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to
contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant
and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we
sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs
to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that
actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good
and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being,
eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and
eternal belong to God; for this is God.
"Those who suppose, as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that supreme beauty and goodness
are not present in the beginning, because the beginnings both of
plants and of animals are causes, but beauty and completeness are in the effects of these, are wrong in their opinion. For the seed
comes from other individuals which are prior and complete, and
the first thing is not seed but the complete being; e.g. we
must say that before the seed there is a man,-not the man
produced from the seed, but another from whom the seed comes.
"It is clear then from what has been said that there is a
substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any
magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it
produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has
infinite power; and, while every magnitude is either infinite
or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite
magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is
no infinite magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other changes are posterior
to change of place.